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Equal Protection and Ectogenesis
Brit Janeway Benjamin*
ABSTRACT
Ectogenesis is the gestation of a fetus in an artificial womb. This
suite of technologies, now in use to preserve the lives of premature
infants, is on the cusp of being a viable method of reproduction from
conception to term. This Article argues that an equal protection
challenge to a ban on utilizing ectogenetic technologies should be
analyzed under intermediate or strict scrutiny. Should the US Supreme
Court apply the rational basis or rational basis “with bite” standard of
review to such a challenge, the petitioner should prevail.
The nature of ectogenesis is a technological alternative for a
sex-specific organ. Intermediate scrutiny is well suited to address the
discriminatory intent and effect behind denying access to ectogenesis,
particularly against the backdrop of an extensive history of bipartisan
legislative support for other artificial organs like the pancreas, kidneys,
and heart. Strict scrutiny further supports protecting access to
ectogenesis, as the fundamental right to procreative freedom necessarily
encapsulates choosing the method of gestating one’s offspring.
While there are legitimate state interests in regulating the
practice of medicine and ensuring the safety of reproductive
biotechnology, prohibiting the use of ectogenesis on the grounds of
preserving the natural order or moral disapproval would fail under even
the most deferential rational basis review standard. Considering the
immutability of reproductive roles, as well as the significance of the right
to choose one’s method of reproduction, if the Court applies this
deferential standard, the rational basis should “bite.”
Under the aforementioned standards of review, access to these
important reproductive biotechnologies should be protected. Whether the
Court finds invidious gender discrimination, the infringement of the
fundamental right to procreate, or impermissible moral condemnation,
*
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it is likely that a ban on ectogenesis would be found to be
unconstitutional.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A very premature infant lies in an incubation bed in a neonatal
intensive care unit (NICU). Born at twenty-four weeks of gestation, she
is considered periviable, meaning born right at the threshold of modern
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medicine’s capacity to save her life.1 Her breathing is supported by
continuous positive airway pressure, which keeps the air passages in
her fragile lungs open.2 Continuous bedside telemetry monitors her
seizure activity and pulmonary function.3 An extracorporeal membrane
oxygenation system takes blood from her veins, pumps it through an
artificial lung where oxygen is added and carbon dioxide removed, and
then returns the blood back into her body.4 The acidity of her blood is
monitored and adjusted using a self-contained blood gas laboratory.5
Countless other technologies support this fragile new life as she
struggles to build enough strength to survive. Her parents spend every
day of her three-month NICU stay praying for medical miracles and
treasuring small victories. Her doctors rely on partial ectogenetic
technology to replicate as many of the functions of the mother’s body as
possible to, in essence, continue the infant’s gestation extracorporeally.
Ectogenesis is the gestation of a fetus outside of a woman’s body
in another substrate, sometimes called an “artificial womb.” The term
was coined by J.B.S. Haldane in a 1923 lecture to the Heretics Society
at Cambridge.6 The etymology of ectogenesis is from the ancient Greek
ektòs (“outside”) and “genesis” (“origin” or “production”).7 Partial
ectogenesis refers to the types of technologies described above, and it is
used all over the world in advanced NICUs to save the lives of
premature infants. Full ectogenesis refers to comprehensive external
gestation, potentially from conception in a laboratory to term and
delivery.
Twenty years ago, it was all but impossible for a
twenty-four-week-old premature infant to survive to hospital
discharge.8 With every passing year, survival rates increase and the
risk of long-term serious disability decreases. In the 1980s, continuous
1.
See The Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Periviable Birth, 130 OBSTETRIC
CARE CONSENSUS e187, e188–89 (2017).
2.
See Life-Saving Technology in the NICU, CHOC, https://www.choc.org/programs-services/nicu/technology [https://perma.cc/JAL4-R6WX] (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
J.B.S. HALDANE, DAEDALUS OR SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE 63–67 (1924); see Zoltan
Istvan, Artificial Wombs Are Coming, but the Controversy Is Already Here, VICE (Aug. 4, 2014, 3:26
PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/8qx8kk/artificial-wombs-are-coming-and-the-controversysalready-here [https://perma.cc/U84U-275G].
7.
See Patricia de Vries, The Speculative Design of Immaculate Motherhood, DIGICULT,
http://digicult.it/design/the-speculative-design-of-immaculate-motherhood/
[https://perma.cc/
6GJC-YYA3] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021); Ectogenesis, WIKTIONARY, https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/ectogenesis [https://perma.cc/L6HA-MMYJ] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
8.
See LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: HOW GENETIC ENGINEERING AND CLONING WILL
TRANSFORM THE AMERICAN FAMILY 66–67 (1997).
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positive airway pressure (CPAP) and mechanical ventilation were used
to support extremely premature infants.9 By the mid-to-late 1990s,
exogenous surfactants—which support fragile lungs from collapse—and
antenatal steroids (to accelerate the maturation of fetal organs) became
part of the neonatologists’ repertoire, substantially increasing survival
rates.10 These and other technological advances pushed viability from
25–26 weeks in the mid-1990s to 23–24 weeks by the mid-2000s.11
Infants now routinely survive delivery at 23–24 weeks. Survival rates
continually tick up while subsequent morbidities gradually decrease.12
In essence, by using partial ectogenetic technology, better mimicking
the support provided by a mother’s uterus, researchers and doctors
continue to expand the timeframe within which infants can be gestated
ex vivo.
Ectogenesis captures the imagination. Haldane’s talk to the
Heretics Society directly inspired Aldous Huxley’s classic work of
fiction, Brave New World, forever cementing ectogenesis in the
collective consciousness as extreme and dystopic. Feminists speculate
that ectogenesis will either liberate women from the foundational
biological disadvantage of gestation or, alternatively, usher in a
mass “gynocide” by rendering women biologically expendable.13 It is
unsurprising that full ectogenesis triggers such a visceral response.
The emergence of this technology would represent a fundamental
disruption of The Way Things Are. Decoupling women’s bodies from
reproduction—for those that opt to—could make the humankind of the
future as different from present-day humans as Homo habilis was from
Australopithecus.14 It would transform our species in unknown ways,
and that disruptive potential has generated decades of dystopian fiction
and bioethicist fretting.
It seems intuitive that most would not object to the use of partial
ectogenetic technology to save the lives of premature infants. Yet, the
objections to full ectogenesis or voluntary reproduction via ectogenesis
9.
Hannah C. Glass, Andrew T. Costarino, Stephen A. Stayer, Claire M. Brett, Franklyn
Cladis & Peter J. Davis, Outcomes for Extremely Premature Infants, 120 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA
1337, 1339 (2015).
10.
Id. at 1337–42.
11.
Id. at 1340.
12.
Id. at 1340–42.
13.
See SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX 205–07 (1970); ANDREA DWORKIN,
RIGHT-WING WOMEN 191–94 (1983).
14.
Australopithecines are considered to be the missing link between apes and the genus
Homo. They had smaller cranial mass and more pronounced jaws. See Adam P. Van Arsdale,
Homo Erectus – A Bigger, Smarter, Faster Hominin Lineage, NATURE EDUC. KNOWLEDGE
PROJECT
(2013),
https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/homo-erectus-a-biggersmarter-97879043/ [https://perma.cc/YW5Q-XYFS].
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abound. Somewhere along the spectrum of intervention, somewhere
between the use of extracorporeal membrane oxygenation and full
ectogenesis, revulsion kicks in for many. That revulsion even unifies
disparate and surprising groups like family-values Republican senators
and every flavor of feminist.
But the equal protection clause is concerned with equality under
the law and specifically precludes government action that is motivated
by disgust or stereotypes. This Article argues that whether the Court
ultimately applies intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny, rational basis
review, or rational basis “with bite,” the use of full ectogenesis for
reproductive purposes ought to be protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection clause. Moral objections cannot
legitimately bar access, nor can dystopian science fantasies. Both the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and ectogenesis
are tools for promoting the flourishing of human life. Full ectogenesis is
coming, perhaps within a few years. Society must be prepared to
grapple with the constitutional issues implicated by its birth.
Part II of the Article gives an overview of available and nascent
ectogenetic technologies. In Part III, it sets forth the approach to the
equal protection analysis herein. Part IV explores how gender-based
classifications made in the regulation of ectogenesis might trigger the
application of intermediate scrutiny and the likelihood of success under
that standard of review. Part V considers whether a ban on full,
voluntary ectogenesis infringes on the fundamental right to procreate,
thus triggering strict scrutiny. Parts VI and VII assess how a rational
basis or rational basis “with bite” analysis might apply if the Court
found no suspect class or fundamental right was implicated by a ban on
ectogenesis.
II. STATUS OF THE TECHNOLOGY
The “14-day rule” is a prohibition on research that involves
growing human embryos ex vivo beyond fourteen days from
fertilization. The rule has been adopted in at least seventeen
countries, including the United States, either by legislative acts or
government-issued scientific guidelines.15 Since its emergence in a 1979
report by the Ethics Advisory Board of the United States Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, the 14-day rule has substantially
impacted the rate and nature of research into human reproduction and
reproductive biotechnology. Indeed, between 1979 and 2016, progress
15.
See Insoo Hyun, Amy Wilkerson & Josephine Johnston, Comment, Revisit the 14-Day
Rule, 533 NATURE 169, 170 (2016).
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toward ectogenesis moved slowly, and there were few major advances.
In 1996, Yoshinori Kuwabara, then-chairman of Tokyo’s Jutendo
University Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, developed a
technique for gestating periviable goat fetuses in a synthetic uterus
termed “extrauterine fetal incubation.”16 His team’s work, which used
oxygenated blood and artificial amniotic fluid, was widely reported as
an important step forward in embryology, despite technical difficulties
and the ultimate death of the goat fetuses.17
However, due to advances in embryology and the growing
awareness of the potential medical value of research into early human
development, the movement to abolish or substantially alter the 14-day
rule found international support among researchers and bioethicists by
2016.18 When researchers at Cambridge University and Rockefeller
University in New York announced their successful growth of human
embryos in vitro for thirteen days, the debate surrounding the 14-day
rule was once again revived.19 This announcement—wherein the
scientists profoundly expanded the window of functional ex vivo
gestation via “[a]n improved culture medium and a better substrate for
embryo attachment”—renewed the bioethical debate about limitations
on human embryo research.20
Prior to this 2016 announcement, Dr. Hung-Ching Liu—a
researcher at Cornell University’s Department of Reproductive
Medicine—ran up against the 14-day rule in her team’s embryological
research. In 2003, Liu and her team successfully gestated a mouse
embryo in a bioprosthetic uterus, almost to full term.21 Following that
success, Dr. Liu grew a human embryo in a similar bioengineered
uterus for ten days, terminating the incubation prior to the
fourteen-day limit placed on embryological researchers.22 Liu, whose
16.
Perri Klass, The Artificial Womb Is Born, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 29, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/29/magazine/the-artificial-womb-is-born.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/83DZ-82RS].
17.
Id.; Katarina Lee, Ectogenesis, 2 VOICES IN BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2016).
18.
See Sarah Knapton, ‘Artificial Womb’ Breakthrough Sparks Row over How Long
Human Embryos Should Be Kept in Lab, TELEGRAPH (May 4, 2016, 10:00 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2016/05/04/artificial-womb-breakthrough-sparks-row-over-how-long-humanembr/ [https://perma.cc/3EMF-DUH2].
19.
Id.
20.
Janet Rossant, Implantation Barrier Overcome, 533 NATURE 182, 182–83 (2016).
21.
Gretchen Reynolds, Artificial Wombs, POPULAR SCI. (Aug. 1, 2005), https://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2005-08/artificial-wombs/ [https://perma.cc/DAR9-ZZV3]. At this time, Dr.
Liu was serving as the Director of the Reproductive Endocrine Laboratory at the Center for
Reproductive Medicine and Infertility at Cornell. See id.
22.
Soraya Chemaly, What Do Artificial Wombs Mean for Women?, REWIRE NEWS GRP.
(Feb. 23, 2012, 8:11 AM), https://rewire.news/article/2012/02/23/what-do-artificial-wombs-meanwomen/ [https://perma.cc/7QSX-3UXZ].
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ultimate goal is to develop a “functioning external womb,” grew a
bioprosthetic uterus by “adding engineered endometrium tissue to a
bio-engineered, extra-uterine ‘scaffold.’”23
The race to develop full ectogenesis was now in full swing. In
April 2017, researchers at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia
(CHOP) published the results of their fetal lamb study wherein their
novel system of extracorporeal gestation successfully supported the
growth of extremely premature and periviable fetal lambs.24 The CHOP
researchers’ system, termed the “biobag,” was intended to closely mimic
the conditions of a sheep uterus, hosting the lambs in a closed synthetic
amniotic sac, circulating fetal blood to oxygenate it, and utilizing an
umbilical interface to their pumpless oxygenator circuit.25 The system
was pumpless in order to protect the fragile fetal hearts from overload
and thus was powered by the beating of the fetal hearts themselves.26
The lambs were born and grew up normally without complications or
defects.27 Dr. Flake, the fetal surgeon in charge of these experiments,
believes his biobag technology could be available for human use within
a few years.28
Hoping to build on CHOP’s successful incubation of lambs,
researchers at the Dutch Eindhoven University of Technology received
a grant of €2.9 million to build a prototype of a new artificial womb in
October 2019.29 The grant was awarded through the Horizon 2020 EU
Program and will enable the Dutch researchers to more accurately
model the experience of a baby in utero using 3D-printed replicas of
human babies monitored with sensors.30
Along with these more visible and controversial announcements,
advances in the less contentious constituent parts of artificial womb
technologies have progressed steadily, mostly without bioethicist and

23.
Id.
24.
Emily A. Partridge, Marcus G. Davey, Matthew A. Hornick, Patrick E. McGovern, Ali
Y. Mejaddam, Jesse D. Vrecenak, Carmen Mesas-Burgos, Aliza Olive, Robert C. Caskey, Theodore
R. Weiland, Jiancheng Han, Alexander J. Schupper, James T. Connelly, Kevin C. Dysart, Jack
Rychik, Holly L. Hedrick, William H. Peranteau & Alan W. Flake, An Extra-Uterine System to
Physiologically Support the Extreme Premature Lamb, NATURE COMMC’NS, Apr. 25, 2017, at 1, 2.
25.
Id. at 2–3.
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Zoltan Istvan, The Abortion Debate Is Stuck. Are Artificial Wombs the Answer?, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/opinion/sunday/abortion-technologydebate.html [https://perma.cc/96FM-QQ6K].
29.
Nicola Davis, Artificial Womb: Dutch Researchers Given €2.9m to Develop Prototype,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2019, 7:13 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/oct/08/artificialwomb-dutch-researchers-given-29m-to-develop-prototype [https://perma.cc/2CB6-84RP].
30.
Id.
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journalistic attention. Improvements in scaffolding materials,
substrates, tubing, and fluid filtration make once-science-fiction
artificial wombs more likely with each passing year. Whether it takes
years or decades to achieve full human ectogenesis, a technological
innovation of this magnitude will certainly engender debates about the
bioethical and legal issues created by its use or regulation. Next, this
Article addresses the question of whether the existing equal protection
clause jurisprudence likely protects the right to reproduce with
ectogenesis.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION FOR REPRODUCTIVE BIOTECHNOLOGY
While the due process clause likely provides protection against
a ban on ectogenesis via the fundamental procreative liberty it
enshrines, the equal protection clause provides another avenue through
which the right to gestate via ectogenesis could be protected.31 The same
body of law ensuring a robust right to reproductive privacy under the
due process clause and the right to be free from government
discrimination under the equal protection clause ought to protect the
use of other forms of reproductive biotechnology. While this Article’s
analysis is focused on ectogenetic technology, most arguments made
herein can be logically extended to protect the individual use of in vitro
fertilization, traditional gestational surrogacy, and other forms of
reproductive biotechnology as of yet unknown to us. Because it is
unclear how the Supreme Court would orient itself toward reproductive
ectogenesis, this Article will evaluate the probability of a successful
challenge under each of the four analytical methods that the Court
historically uses for equal protection challenges.
This Article concludes that whatever the standard of review, as
outlined below, a ban on ectogenesis would be unlikely to pass
constitutional muster. Given the dangers of traditional gestation, a
technological alternative could save countless maternal and fetal lives.
Beyond the physical impacts of gestation, this Article discusses the
social and economic costs of traditional physical gestation and the
disproportionate harms borne by gestating women. When ectogenesis
reaches the stage of safety and availability for patient adoption, all but
the most regressive and illegitimate government interests will remain.
As discussed herein, a ban on this technology would thus violate the
equal protection clause’s guarantees against legislation that promotes

31.
See Brit Janeway Benjamin, Ectogenesis: Is There a Constitutional Right to
Substrate-Independent Wombs?, 20 U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 166 (2020).
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mandatory adherence to traditional sex and gender roles, including that
which ensures a permanent gestating caste.
First, this Article discusses the intermediate scrutiny standard
applied to gender-based classifications. As a threshold matter, a
gender-based classification can only withstand intermediate scrutiny if
the challenged classification serves important government objectives
and the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the
achievement of that objective.32
Second, this Article considers strict scrutiny, which is applied to
violations of equal protection where a fundamental right is implicated.
When government action treats classes of people unequally with regard
to a fundamental right, the court applies strict scrutiny. The
government then bears the burden of proving the classification is
narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling government interest.33
Third, this Article considers a ban on ectogenesis under the
rational basis test. Under this test, the classification carries a
presumption of constitutionality, and the claimant must prove that the
government action is not even a rational means for furthering a
legitimate government interest. This is the standard most deferential
to the government. Even in light of the extraordinary deference to the
government’s actions, this Article argues that a ban on voluntary
reproduction via ectogenesis could not survive an equal protection
challenge under rational basis review.
Fourth, this Article analyzes ectogenesis under the rational
basis “with bite” standard set forth in Plyler v. Doe for classifications
based on a semi-suspect class or regarding a semi-fundamental right.34
Although this standard has been used only sparingly, when used, the
Court applies a presumption of unconstitutionality requiring the
government to prove that the classification was “a demonstrably and
substantially effective means to further its goals.”35 For this rule to
apply, the challenger must demonstrate “that the class affected has
some similarities to suspect or semi-suspect classes, that the right
affected is very important, and the disability imposed is very severe.”36

32.
33.

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Strict Scrutiny, CORNELL L. SCH.
LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny [https://perma.cc/GAJ4LRXK] (last visited Feb. 22, 2021).
34.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982).
35.
Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
121, 158 (1989).
36.
Id.

788

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:4:779

IV. GENDER-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS AND INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
A statute that discriminates on the basis of gender is presumed
unconstitutional and evaluated under the intermediate scrutiny
standard of review.37 Intermediate scrutiny requires that the gender
classification “serve important government objectives and must be
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”38 Before
evaluating whether the statute satisfies intermediate scrutiny,
however, the court must evaluate whether the gender classification
appears in the statute. If the statute is gender-neutral on its face, the
challenger bears the burden of establishing that the government’s
classification discriminates both in effect and purpose—often referred
to as the “Feeney evil purpose test.”39 This Part addresses facial
neutrality and assesses how government action may or may not satisfy
the Feeney evil purpose test if it banned ectogenesis.
A. Facial or Neutral Classification
The government could establish an ectogenesis ban that equally
restricts all people from the gestation, development, or nurturance of a
child via ectogenesis. In this hypothetical ban, the government would
make no mention of the actor’s gender, and it would disallow all people
from participating in full reproductive ectogenesis. This hypothetical
statutory language, modeled off of existing state anti-cloning laws,40
reflects what such a facially neutral ban may look like:
No person shall gestate, develop, or otherwise nurture a human embryo or fetus
extracorporeally after fourteen days from fertilization, except for the purpose of
preserving the life or health of an infant born of a woman before reaching full term.

This type of statute prohibits ectogenesis for reproductive
purposes, except to preserve the life and health of premature infants.
The language “born of a woman” is drawn from state and federal
statutes regarding personhood, parentage, and putative fatherhood,
and would likely be included to exempt the widely supported practice of
saving infants who are born preterm following in vivo gestation.41

37.
Id. at 142.
38.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
39.
Galloway, supra note 35, at 142.
40.
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-727(B) (West 2020); 105 MASS. CODE REGS.
960.007 (2020).
41.
See generally 1 U.S.C. § 8(a)–(b) (defining the word “person” as “every infant member
of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage of development”). A member of the
species Homo sapiens is born alive following “the complete expulsion or extraction from his or her
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If a state adopts a similar statute in which there are no facial
classifications, then constitutional challengers will bear the burden of
satisfying the Feeney evil purpose test before the Court applies
intermediate scrutiny. Alternatively, if a future ban on ectogenesis
includes a facial gender classification, then intermediate scrutiny would
automatically apply. Given the legislative history of reproductive
biotechnology statutes, however, it is unlikely that a state would enact
a ban with facial gender classifications.
B. Discriminatory Effect
When a government action is facially neutral, whether
heightened scrutiny applies depends on whether the government action
discriminates in both effect and purpose. The discriminatory effect of a
ban on ectogenesis is self-evident. The burdens borne by the female sex
in traditional gestation are significant. Radhika Rao, a constitutional
law scholar and professor at UC Hastings, powerfully and accurately
described pregnancy as “a profound invasion of the body that imposes
physical, psychological, and social burdens upon a woman, threatening
both her right to bodily autonomy and gender equality.”42 The physical
impacts of pregnancy for women are well measured, as are the economic
risks. Pregnancy is uncomfortable in the best case, deadly in the worst,
and always imposes social and financial costs that are unique to
women.43 Even healthy women experience a range of symptoms,
including “morning sickness, dizziness, headache, bone and muscle
aches, loss of visual acuity, bleeding gums, breathlessness, heartburn,
varicose veins and haemorrhoids.”44 In at least 15 percent of
pregnancies, life-threatening complications arise to put the gestating
mother at risk of death. Even safer deliveries can result in vaginal
tearing and episiotomy.45 Women of advanced age or physical
immaturity, and those who have ailments like diabetes or HIV, face
increased physical risks from gestation and delivery. Further, working
professionals who are visibly pregnant are “judged as less committed to
their jobs, less dependable, and less authoritative” than nonpregnant

mother of that member,” which would seem to exclude infants born via ectogenetic technology from
legal personhood. See id.
42.
Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive
Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1485 (2008).
43.
See Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM.
SOCIO. REV., no. 2, 2001, at 204, 219.
44.
EVIE KENDAL, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE CASE FOR STATE SPONSORED
ECTOGENESIS 3 (2015).
45.
Id.
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women in comparable managerial roles.46 Women whose careers render
pregnancy unsafe or impossible must often sacrifice their careers to
pursue motherhood or forgo it altogether.47
The pursuit of procreative liberty is unique among all
constitutional rights, as access to no other constitutional right is
predicated upon a violation of bodily integrity. The absence of a
negative right to utilize ectogenesis means that women must bear
enormous physical risk, economic disadvantage, and social stigma just
to participate in the central survival task of our species—procreation.
Men bear no such costs. Therefore, it is clear that a ban on the use of
ectogenesis would have a substantially disparate impact on women as
a class. It would deprive women of an opportunity to remove a
fundamental biological disadvantage, cementing a sexual hierarchy
that could be avoided through technology. However, the profound
discriminatory effect alone is not sufficient to justify the application of
the intermediate scrutiny standard; the challenger must also prove that
the government acted with a discriminatory purpose, as articulated in
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.
C. Discriminatory Intent: Feeney Evil Purpose Test
In Feeney, plaintiff Helen B. Feeney, a female nonveteran,
challenged a Massachusetts statute that provided an absolute
preference for hiring veterans to fill state civil service jobs on the
grounds that the statute “operate[d] overwhelmingly to the advantage
of males” in contravention of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.48 Although Feeney achieved the second- and
third-highest scores on two of the civil service examinations she took,
she was placed sixth on the list of eligible hires, behind five
lower-scoring male veterans for one position and twelfth behind eleven
male veterans for another.49 The Court found that the “impact of the
veterans’ preference law upon the public employment opportunities of
women ha[d] . . . been severe.”50 As the Court explained, the states
retain power to make classifications that cause statutes to have uneven
impact on certain groups and “uneven effects upon particular groups
46.
Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood
Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOCIO., no. 5, 2007, at 1297, 1298.
47.
See Ellen L. Mozurkewich, Barbara Luke, Michal Avni & Fredric M. Wolf, Working
Conditions and Adverse Pregnancy Outcome: A Meta-Analysis, 95 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, no.
4, 2000, at 623, 633.
48.
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979).
49.
Id. at 264.
50.
Id. at 271.
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within a class are ordinarily of no constitutional concern.”51 However,
certain classifications, such as race, “in themselves supply a reason to
infer antipathy,” a motivation that does run afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment.52
Citing its prior decisions in Washington v. Davis and Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Court held
that “if a neutral law had a disproportionately adverse effect upon a
racial minority, it is unconstitutional . . . only if that impact can be
traced to a discriminatory purpose.”53 A law banning the use of
ectogenetic technology would not likely classify individuals on the face
of the statute. Instead, as with the hypothetical ban and current laws
that ban human reproductive cloning, the law would likely seek to
prohibit doctors, researchers, and prospective parents from utilizing the
technologies for reproductive purposes.54 When a law “appears to be
neutral but in reality is a subterfuge designed to impose hidden burdens
on an unpopular class,” the Court will find that it violates the equal
protection clause.55
In Feeney, the Court articulated a two-part inquiry to be utilized
when “a statute gender-neutral on its face is challenged on the ground
that its effects upon women are disproportionately adverse.”56 The first
part seeks to determine “whether the statutory classification is indeed
neutral in the sense that it is not gender based” and whether “the
classification itself, covert or overt, is not based upon gender.”57
The second part of the inquiry “is whether the adverse effect reflects
invidious gender-based discrimination.”58 It is the “purposeful
discrimination,” not the disproportionate impact alone, that is
unconstitutional.59 Intermediate scrutiny is applied to facially neutral
classifications where both parts of the test are satisfied.

51.
Id. at 271–72 (first citing N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); then
citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 538 (1972); and then citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137 (1971)).
52.
Id. at 272.
53.
Id.; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
54.
See KERRY LYNN MACINTOSH, ILLEGAL BEINGS: HUMAN CLONES AND THE LAW 155
(2005).
55.
Id.
56.
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274.
57.
Id. (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252).
58.
Id.
59.
Id. (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
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1. Whether the Classification Is Neutral-in-Fact
In determining whether the veterans’ preference statute passed
constitutional muster in Feeney, the Court stated that “[i]f the
impact . . . could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact
itself would signal that the real classification made by the law was in
fact not neutral.”60 The Court evaluated the composition of the veteran
class, noting that “[v]eteran status is not uniquely male” and that the
“nonveteran class is not substantially all female.”61 It found that “[t]oo
many men are affected [by the statute] to permit the inference that the
statute is but a pretext for preferring men over women.”62
In the ectogenesis context, there are persuasive indications that
a ban would be “in fact not neutral.”63 Unlike veteran status, gestating
status is unique to the female sex. All female-bodied individuals will
decide whether to gestate after considering the costs and benefits of
pregnancy and parenthood. Ectogenesis can influence this calculus
because it alleviates some of the economic, political, and social costs of
pregnancy that are borne all but exclusively by female-bodied
individuals.64 Unlike the veterans in Feeney, the gestating class of
people (those who would be disproportionately disadvantaged by a ban
on ectogenesis) is exclusively female.
Also in Feeney, the Court stated that a classification that
was based on gender, either covertly or overtly, would not be
neutral-in-fact.65 Thus, a statute outright banning ectogenesis might
use ostensibly gender-neutral language, but the regulation would be
inherently gender-referential by referring to gestation at all. The word
“gestation” comes from the Latin word “gestare” meaning “to carry in
the womb.”66 Since womb bearers are people with female reproductive
organs, whatever their gender identity, any reference to gestation is a
sex-specific reference. A statute regulating the manner of gestation will
always be an overt or covert sex or gender reference.
60.
Id. at 275 (first citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); and then citing
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266).
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. (first citing Washington, 426 U.S. at 242; and then citing Arlington Heights, 429
U.S. at 266).
64.
“All but exclusively” refers to the capacity for some transgender men, who have
retained their uteruses post-transition, to gestate. See Thomas Beatie, Labor of Love, ADVOCATE
(Mar. 14, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.advocate.com/news/2008/03/14/labor-love [https://perma.cc/
8B5U-XMRC].
65.
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274 (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252).
66.
Gestate, LEXICO, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/gestate [https://perma.cc/
W9Z6-7T2M] (last visited Mar. 1, 2021).
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Because the affected class of gestating people is occupied all but
exclusively by females, and because any reference to gestation
implicates female reproduction, the Court could reasonably find a ban
on ectogenesis to not be neutral-in-fact. As a result, the Court would
analyze the challenge under intermediate scrutiny. Should the Court
find that a ban on ectogenesis is neutral-in-fact, a second inquiry would
be required to assess whether the classification was motivated by
invidious sex or gender discrimination. If the answer is affirmative, the
Court would then analyze the statute under intermediate scrutiny.67
2. Whether the Classification Is Motivated by Invidious Gender
Discrimination
In Feeney, the Court noted that the legislature must have been
aware that “most veterans are men,” and that it would “thus be
disingenuous to say that the adverse consequences of the legislation for
women were unintended, in the sense that they were not volitional or
in the sense that they were not foreseeable.”68 However, intent as to
discriminatory purpose “implies more than intent as volition or intent
as awareness of consequences.”69 To prove that the legislature acted
with discriminatory intent in promulgating a neutral-in-fact statute
requires proof that it “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group.”70 The legislative history of the
original veterans’ preference law, as well as the modern iterations,
supported the conclusion that the law was intended to benefit all
veterans, not merely males or male veterans.71 Since the plaintiff failed
to demonstrate that the “law in any way reflect[ed] a purpose to
discriminate on the basis of sex,” the Court found that the statute did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.72 However, the cases of
Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., provide parameters for evaluating whether state
action is motivated by invidious gender discrimination.
In Washington v. Davis, applicants for police officer positions at
the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department challenged
67.
See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274 (explaining the intermediate scrutiny framework that
applies to statutes found to have a discriminatory effect on one sex).
68.
Id. at 278.
69.
Id. at 279 (citing United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144,
179 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
70.
Id.
71.
Id. at 279–80.
72.
Id. at 281.
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the department’s recruiting procedures, including a written personnel
test that “excluded a disproportionately high number” of Black
applicants.73 The test, referred to as “Test 21,” was designed by the Civil
Service Commission to test “verbal ability, vocabulary, reading, and
comprehension.”74 Black applicants failed Test 21 more often than
white applicants.75 The Court held that despite the disproportionate
impact on Black applicants, no cognizable equal protection claim
existed absent a racially discriminatory purpose.76
One year later, in Arlington Heights, the respondent MHDC
sought to build low-income and moderate-income housing, requesting a
rezoning of a parcel of land from single family to multifamily.77 MHDC’s
rezoning application included a reference to Section 236 of the federal
Fair Housing Act, which required “an affirmative marketing plan
designed to assure that a subsidized development is racially
integrated.”78 The Village Plan Commission denied the respondent’s
petition for rezoning on the grounds that (1) rezoning the parcel
“threatened to cause a measurable drop in property value for
neighboring sites” and (2) the Village’s zoning policy stated that
multifamily zoning was “primarily to serve as a buffer between
single-family development” and “commercial and manufacturing
districts.”79 MHDC challenged the Village’s decision on the grounds
that their denial of the rezoning request was racially discriminatory
and thus violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.80 Both the US District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois and the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that
the Village’s decision was motivated not by racial animus, but by a
desire to protect property values and zoning plan integrity.81 However,
the courts’ opinions differed on whether the denial would have a racially
discriminatory effect—the district court concluded that the denial
would not have a racially discriminatory effect, while the court of
appeals found just the opposite.82 Under the appellate court’s decision,
strict scrutiny must apply.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232–33 (1976).
Id. at 234–35.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 245.
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254 (1977).
Id. at 257.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 259–60.
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When the Supreme Court decided Arlington Heights, it
reiterated that “official action will not be held unconstitutional solely
because it results in a racially disproportionate impact” and that
“[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show
a violation” of the equal protection clause.83 The Court set forth a
“sensitive inquiry” for determining whether the government actor’s
decision was motivated, at least in part, by a discriminatory purpose.84
The proof of discriminatory purpose should be drawn from whatever
“circumstantial and direct evidence of intent” is available, including,
but not limited to, the disparate impact of the decision, the historical
background of the decision, departures from normal procedures, and
the legislative history of the action.85 If the decision can be explained on
no grounds other than discrimination—even where it appears neutral
on its face—the “evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy.”86 The
Court upheld the rezoning denial, finding that the respondent failed to
meet its evidentiary burden of establishing that the aforementioned
factors suggest that the denial was motivated by a discriminatory
intent.87
Considering the standard set forth in Washington v. Davis and
affirmed in Arlington Heights, there is a substantial likelihood that any
ban on ectogenesis for non-safety reasons88 (assuming the technology is
safe for the prospective gestated fetus) would be motivated by invidious
gender discrimination. First, the disparate impact of a ban on
ectogenesis is notable, as previously discussed in Section IV.B, and is a
factor favoring the conclusion of invidious gender discrimination.
Second, the historical background of the dialogue surrounding
ectogenesis in politics and art supports the same conclusion, although
the specific legislative history of any statute (what would be the third
factor) does not yet exist. One congressman has previously contended
that the transition from viviparous gestation to ectogenesis would lead
to the production of offspring that are “nothing but psychological
monsters.”89 It is reasonable, therefore, to expect any legislative history

83.
Id. at 264–65.
84.
Id. at 265–66.
85.
Id. at 266–68.
86.
Id. at 266.
87.
Id. at 270.
88.
See id. at 264–65; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976). In this context,
“non-safety reasons” means that the technology is assumed to be safe for the gestated fetus.
89.
See 117 CONG. REC. 12736–44 (1971) (citing Man into Superman: The Promise and
Peril of the New Genetics, TIME, Apr. 19, 1971, at 33, printed into the Congressional Record on
request of Senator Walter Mondale in support of his proposal to create a Commission on Health,
Science, and Society).
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for ectogenesis bans to contain gendered references to the natural order
and a host of implied or express gender discrimination. Similarly,
congressional debates about anti-cloning bills have contained equally
extreme denunciations. “There is no great invention,” as Haldane’s
1923 address notes, “from fire to flying, which has not been hailed as an
insult to some god.”90 This apothegm is manifest across the
Congressional Record when reproductive biotechnology or comparably
disruptive technologies are addressed.
The history of congressional debate and activity provides insight
into the moral disapproval that has informed prior legislative
discussions on ectogenesis. David Weldon cosponsored a bill (H.R. 534)
entitled the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, which sought to
ban human cloning for both research and reproductive purposes.91
Weldon asserted that the “artificial womb is available to us today” and
that the combination of human cloning and artificial wombs rendered
fetal tissue harvesting “the next place these researchers will want to
go.”92 He argued that “it is a moral and ethical minefield that . . . we as
a Nation should not enter into.”93 In 2007, an article by William B.
Hurlbut was printed into the Congressional Record, stating that “the
ongoing research to create an artificial endometrium (a kind of artificial
womb) that would allow extracorporeal gestation of cloned embryos
to later stages for the production of more advanced cells” posed
“concerns about the commodification and commercialization of eggs
and embryos.”94 These statements reflect congressional attitudes,
especially, but not exclusively, that more technologically conservative
factions would likely advance any ban on ectogenesis. This suggests
that impermissible invidious gender discrimination would be present.
In addition to the established legislative history, an ectogenesis
ban could prove to be invidious discrimination when one considers the
technology’s effect on traditional gender-based household dynamics.
Ectogenesis will be a meaningful departure from the once-unavoidable
gender roles implicated in traditional gestation. Given the intense
moral dialogue around gender roles in the United States and the
far-reaching impact that changes in the gestational status quo would
have, the historical background of a ban on ectogenesis must be read
broadly to be read accurately. Along with specific discussions of
ectogenesis before the legislature, the discussions of gender morality in

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

HALDANE, supra note 6, at 44.
149 CONG. REC. 4412 (2003) (statement of Rep. David Weldon).
Id. at 4414.
Id.
153 CONG. REC. 8564 (2007).
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US politics should come to bear on the historical background of any
statute regarding ectogenesis. The Moral Majority, the organization
whose socially conservative mission has continued to inform the US
religious right, coalesced in the late 1970s and early 1980s, intent on
“responding to a host of societal ills through legislation.”95 Their stated
goals included reestablishing traditional gender roles and preventing
the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, which “challenged the
very foundation of the conservative Christian worldview: the idea that
gender was a sacred, God-given certainty in an uncertain fluctuating
world.”96 James Dobson, a psychologist whose books on gender and
marriage captured the traditionalist models of sex and gender adopted
by the Moral Majority, derided feminists for the erosion of respect for
the masculine, viewing this “as a crisis of gender, but also as a threat
to national security.”97 The gender-essentialist mission of the Moral
Majority has persisted long after the formal dissolution of the
organization in 1989.98
Family values and the nature of gender roles are still important
issues to US voters and their congresspeople. In 2015, 21 percent of
Americans said they would only vote for a political candidate who
shared their views on abortion, the highest in Gallup’s nineteen-year
history of gathering data on this question.99 By 2020, that figure
reached 24 percent, with 47 percent placing abortion as one of many
important factors to their vote.100 Today, about 85 percent of Americans
view cloning humans as morally wrong.101 While only 34 percent believe
that children are just as well off if their mother works outside of the
home, 76 percent believe the children are just as well off if their father
works outside of the home.102 When surveyed, 53 percent believe that a
95.
Doug Banwart, Jerry Falwell, the Rise of the Moral Majority, and the 1980 Election,
W. ILL. HIST. REV. 133, 133–35 (2013).
96.
Kristin Du Mez, Donald Trump and Militant Evangelical Masculinity,
RELIGION & POL. (Jan. 17, 2017), http://religionandpolitics.org/2017/01/17/donald-trump-and-militant-evangelical-masculinity/ [https://perma.cc/2Y33-HXFC]; id. at 135.
97.
Du Mez, supra note 96; see JAMES C. DOBSON, STRAIGHT TALK TO MEN AND THEIR
WIVES (1980).
98.
See Banwart, supra note 95, at 154.
99.
Rebecca Riffkin, Abortion Edges Up as Important Voting Issue for Americans, GALLUP
(May 29, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/183449/abortion-edges-important-voting-issue-americans.aspx? [https://perma.cc/LCZ4-8DK7].
100.
Megan Brenan, One in Four Americans Consider Abortion a Key Voting Issue, GALLUP
(July 7, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/313316/one-four-americans-consider-abortion-key-voting-issue.aspx [https://perma.cc/UMC3-F5HK].
101.
Moral
Issues,
GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1681/Moral-Issues.aspx?
[https://perma.cc/22YW-4L34] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
102.
D’Vera Cohn, Gretchen Livingston & Wendy Wang, Public Views on Staying at Home
vs. Working, PEW RSCH. CTR.: SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Apr. 8, 2014),

798

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:4:779

woman would do a better job than a man in caring for a new baby, even
excluding breastfeeding from consideration.103
In a 2007 Gallup poll, 86 percent of Republicans and 72 percent
of Democrats said that the presidential candidates’ “positions on family
values” would be “extremely important” or “very important” to their
voting choice. As of May 2016, 73 percent of Americans think “the state
of moral values in the country as a whole” is getting worse.104 As moral
and reproductive issues continue to dominate US political discourse,
these perceptions and fears of technological disruption of reproduction
are likely to influence legislative action. If and when a ban on
ectogenesis is passed and challenged, evaluating the history of gender
discrimination and related antecedent moral views must inform the
inquiry into whether the historical background supports an implication
of invidious gender discrimination.
As to the fourth and last Arlington Heights factor, a ban on full
ectogenesis would be a departure from normal procedure showing
evidence of discriminatory intent. Importantly, Congress has previously
offered regular support for the development and approval of artificial
organs and research into the technological assistance of vital organ
functions. In April 2011, 250 members of the House of Representatives
and 60 senators sent a letter to the Food and Drug Administration
expressing their support for the approval of the artificial pancreas.105 A
bipartisan coalition of congressional leaders continued to speak out
in favor of the development and approval of the artificial pancreas,
calling it a “transformative medical technology” with the “potential to
dramatically improve the health and quality of life of those who have
diabetes.”106 Other artificial organs have received broad support from
Congress. The 2010 Department of Defense and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act contained a $1 million funding allocation for work
by the University of Tennessee College of Medicine with artificial
bone implants and grafts.107 Members of Congress have praised the

https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2014/04/08/chapter-4-public-views-on-staying-athome-vs-working/ [https://perma.cc/GDC7-43S3].
103.
Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Kim Parker, Nikki Graf & Gretchen Livingston, Gender
and Caregiving, PEW RSCH. CTR.: SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Mar. 23, 2017), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/03/23/gender-and-caregiving/ [https://perma.cc/DFS7-9M2X].
104.
Moral Issues, supra note 101.
105.
157 CONG. REC. 14168 (2011) (statement of Rep. Gene Green).
106.
Id. at 16215 (statement of Rep. John Kline), 18145 (statement of Rep. Patrick Tiberi).
107.
155 CONG. REC. 32623 (2009) (statement of Rep. Zach Wamp).
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life-saving impact of the artificial kidney and the research into
developing artificial livers.108
In light of the aforementioned congressional endorsements of
artificial organ development, it is apparent that Congress has no
reservations about the replacement or salvaging of human organs with
technological alternatives.109 The Court should consider this favorable
disposition toward other artificial organs when analyzing any ban on
ectogenesis. Congressional disapproval of this one technological organ,
combined with the history of disapproval of artificial wombs in
Congress and culture, would be strongly suggestive of invidious
discrimination. If Congress espouses a general approval of artificial
organs but carves out an exception for artificial wombs, combined with
the congressional history of revulsion towards reproductive changes via
technology, then invidious discrimination resolves the cognitive
dissonance and balances the equation. The objections are not about
artificial organs—they are about shifting gender norms.
In Washington v. Davis, the Court held that where a legislative
action could be explained by nothing other than invidious
discrimination, it would fail even when the statute was neutral on its
face. As discussed throughout this Article so far, the economic and social
costs of physical gestation are great. The availability of a technological
alternative stands to alleviate these enormous costs and provides an
alternative to gestation that is safer for both the mother and fetus.
Should fetus-safe full ectogenesis become available, it would be difficult
to explain its prohibition on any grounds other than a desire to preserve
traditional gender roles.
In sum, given the disparate impact on women, the likely
legislative discourse, and subsequent deviation from the historical
legislative support of artificial organs, a ban on ectogenesis would likely
be found to have been motivated, at least in part, by intentional
invidious gender discrimination. Thus, at a minimum, both the
discriminatory impact and discriminatory purpose required by Feeney
would be met by any ban on ectogenesis, urging the application of
intermediate scrutiny to a ban on ectogenesis.
3. Whether an Ectogenesis Ban Would Survive Intermediate Scrutiny
If a ban on ectogenesis either contained a facial classification on
the basis of gender or was facially neutral but the Feeney evil purpose
108.
See 148 CONG. REC. E199 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Jim McDermott);
152 CONG. REC. 8857 (2006) (statement of Rep. Stephen Lynch).
109.
This author performed a thorough search of the Congressional Record and found no
negative treatment of any artificial non-uterus organ by any member of Congress from any party.
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test was satisfied, the Court would apply intermediate scrutiny to
evaluate the constitutionality of the statute. Intermediate scrutiny
requires that the government establish that there is an important
government interest and that the classification is substantially related
to that interest, serving as a middle ground between strict scrutiny and
rational basis review.110 Given the enormous potential benefits of
ectogenetic technologies, it would be difficult for the government to
articulate important interests that could be advanced by a ban on
ectogenesis.
The Court has yet to hear an equal protection case regarding
ectogenesis or a direct analogue to ectogenesis, which renders the task
of analyzing the constitutionality of such a potential statute premature.
Furthermore, whether an interest is sufficiently “important” for
intermediate scrutiny purposes is an exercise in subjectivity that varies
depending on the level of generality the Court uses to articulate the
interest.111 However, the equal protection jurisprudential landscape
does provide some sense of the types of government interests that are
or are not characterized as “important” and, more operatively, whether
gendered classifications are held to be substantially related to those
interests. While important interests in support of a ban on ectogenesis
might include ensuring the health of prospective mothers and gestated
infants or regulating the practice of medicine, the government would
also bear the burden of establishing that a ban on ectogenesis is
substantially related to those interests. While intermediate scrutiny
appears to be a two-part test, the prongs are typically analyzed together
such that the inquiry is in fact whether the stated government interest
is substantially advanced by the classification.
Predicting accurately how the Court might interpret the
importance of the interests set forth in support of a ban on ectogenesis
is difficult. The case law provides limited instruction. Interests that
have been held insufficiently important include “reducing the workload
on probate courts” and “avoiding intrafamily controversy.”112 Achieving
administrative efficiency is likewise an inadequate state objective.113
Benign race or gender classifications, classifications drawn in an
attempt to remedy specific historical examples of prejudice, are
unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny where the classification
is not tied to a sufficiently precise historical disadvantage.114 In United
110.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
111.
See Roger Craig Green, Interest Definition in Equal Protection: A Study of Judicial
Technique, 108 YALE L.J. 439, 443–59 (1998).
112.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
113.
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973).
114.
See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728–29 (1982).

2021]

EQUAL PROTECTION AND ECTOGENESIS

801

States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court reviewed the Virginia Military
Institute’s male-only admissions policy under intermediate scrutiny.115
While the Court held that the mission of educating “citizen soldiers”
was important, the discriminatory admissions policy was not
“substantially advanced by women’s categorical exclusion.”116
In the case of ectogenesis, if the articulated government interest
was the protection of the health of prospective mothers, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to argue that a ban on the technology
substantially serves that interest. As discussed throughout this Article,
gestation is a dangerous endeavor. Since the Center for Disease Control
began its Pregnancy Mortality Surveillance System in 1987, maternal
mortality in the United States has steadily risen.117 For women in their
childbearing years, death as a result of complications from pregnancy
is a top-ten cause of death for women in their childbearing years.118
While protecting maternal life and health would very likely constitute
an important government interest, a ban on ectogenesis would actively
undermine that purpose, not substantially advance it. Protecting the
lives of infants gestated by ectogenesis is also likely to be understood as
an important government interest. Whether a ban substantially relates
to that goal would simply depend on the nature of the technology. If the
technology substantially improves outcomes for gestated infants, such
as reducing the incidence of birth defects, or has a neutral impact on
neonatal outcomes, the government would be unlikely to succeed in
satisfying its burden to prove that a ban is substantially related to the
interest of protecting gestating infants. If the technology is unable to
safely bring a child to term, then even rational basis review would be
inadequate to prevent a ban, as discussed later in this Article.
If the Court applies intermediate scrutiny to a ban on
ectogenesis, the likelihood of success would vary based on the actual
impacts of the applied technology, the level of generality with which the
Court articulates the government interest(s), and whether those
interests are deemed sufficiently important.

115.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 548, 555–58 (1996).
116.
Id. at 547–48.
117.
Pregnancy
Mortality
Surveillance
System,
CDC:
R EPROD.
HEALTH,
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternal-mortality/pregnancy-mortality-surveillancesystem.htm [https://perma.cc/KZ8Y-A9WC] (last updated Nov. 25, 2020).
118.
Leading Causes of Death - Females - All Races and Origins - United States, 2017,
CDC:
HEALTH
EQUITY,
https://www.cdc.gov/women/lcod/2017/all-races-origins/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/CM73-BAEZ] (last updated Nov. 20, 2019) (characterizing “childbearing years”
as the 20–44 year age range).
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V. STRICT SCRUTINY OF CLASSIFICATIONS IMPLICATING A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
When an equal protection challenge is brought on the grounds
that a classification implicates a fundamental right, the Court performs
a two-part analysis. First, the Court asks whether the classification
implicates a fundamental right.119 Second, the Court asks whether that
right was infringed.120 If both of these parts are satisfied, the Court
applies strict scrutiny to the constitutionality assessment.121 In the case
of a ban on ectogenesis, the Court should find that the two-part test is
satisfied and require, pursuant to strict scrutiny, that the government
bear the burden of proving that its classification is narrowly tailored to
fulfill a compelling government interest.122
A. The Classification Implicates the Fundamental Right to Procreate
The Court has held that the right to procreate is fundamental,
as it is both essential “to the very existence and survival of the race”
and “one of the basic civil rights of man.”123 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,
the petitioner was convicted once for stealing chickens and twice for
robbery with firearms and was imprisoned in the Oklahoma State
Reformatory when Oklahoma’s 1935 Habitual Criminal Sterilization
Act was passed.124 The Act provided that those convicted of three or
more “felonies involving moral turpitude” be subject to sterilization,
and so a judgment directing that he be sterilized by vasectomy was
made.125 In reviewing his case, the Supreme Court defined procreation
as a fundamental right whose infringement should be subject to
heightened scrutiny.126 Sterilizing some types of criminals, and not
others “who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense,”
119.
See Galloway, supra note 35, at 125.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
See Robert T. Miller, What Is a Compelling Governmental Interest?, 21 J.
MKTS. & MORALITY 71, 71, 79 (2018); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); supra Part
V. For an interest to be considered compelling, it must be necessary or essential, and pursued in
the least restrictive manner possible. Miller, supra, at 71–72. This requirement is a departure
from the substantial interest pursued in a narrowly tailored way as required under intermediate
scrutiny. Id. at 73. Under strict scrutiny, the burden on the government to articulate and defend
the stated end-interest and means is heavy. Id. The Court has refrained from articulating the
exact edges of what circumstances constitute a compelling interest, likely because there is
insufficient normative clarity and consensus to justify such a definition. See id.
123.
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
124.
Id. at 537.
125.
Id. at 537, 539.
126.
Id. at 541.
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was held to run afoul of the equal protection clause.127 The
characterization of procreation as a fundamental right in Skinner has
been upheld, without exception, in subsequent case law since the
seminal holding in 1942. Because the manner of gestation is central to
the process of procreating, ectogenesis implicates this fundamental
right to procreate. Parents who wish to procreate must have a viable
womb or contract to utilize a viable womb in order to procreate.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, which involved a challenge to a
Connecticut ban on contraceptive distribution, the Court held that a
“zone of privacy” is “created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees” and that the marital relationship, including the marital
bedroom and choices made therein, is protected by this right of
privacy.128 The Court held that the ban on contraceptive use was an
unconstitutional intrusion into the realm of martial privacy, “a right of
privacy older than the Bill of Rights.”129 A decision about how to gestate
one’s child lands squarely within this zone of privacy because it is a
choice undertaken with the highest sensitivity, having the nearest
connection to marital and medical privacy of almost any other decision
a person might make. Since it was decided, Griswold has been
consistently cited and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court as meaning
that “the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.” Further,
Griswold and its jurisprudential progeny clarify that the “decision
whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this cluster
of constitutionally protected choices.”130 Therefore, a ban on
ectogenesis—one of the few available gestational methods—would
clearly implicate the fundamental right to procreate.131 Like
contraception, ectogenesis is technology that would have been
unimaginable to the framers of the Constitution. Yet, the use of both
technologies falls within the zone of privacy older than the Bill of Rights
and is essential to the expression of personhood and family: whether,
when, and how to bear a child.
B. The Fundamental Right to Procreate Would Be Infringed
Once the Court has found that a classification implicates a
fundamental right, it endeavors to determine whether that right is
127.
Id.
128.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
129.
Id. at 486.
130.
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685, 687 (1977).
131.
For a more in-depth discussion of the fundamental nature of the right to reproduce via
ectogenesis, please see Benjamin, supra note 31.
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infringed by the classification. Infringement may take the form of either
an outright prohibition on the exercise of a fundamental right or some
lesser means of limiting the exercise of that right. In Kramer v. Union
Free School District, a bachelor who neither owned nor leased taxable
property within a school district challenged a New York education law
on the grounds that it violated the equal protection clause.132 The law
specified that only those who owned or leased “taxable real property
within the district” or who were parents or custodial guardians of
“children enrolled in the local public schools” were entitled to vote in
the school district elections.133 The Court gave “the statute a close and
exacting determination” because the right to vote is a fundamental one.
It therefore found that the extension of the franchise to some residents
and not others denied equal protection of the laws to Kramer and others
who were excluded by the statute.134 An outright ban on ectogenesis
would justify a comparably exacting determination about whether the
right to procreate was infringed. The fundamental right to control and
manage one’s own reproductive choices deserves the same scope of
protection as the right to vote, as it is at least as essential to the exercise
of liberty in a free society as participation in the political process.
Infringement may also be found from a “lesser interference” that
“substantially deters the exercise of the right or makes the exercise of
the right materially more difficult.”135 In Attorney General of New York
v. Soto-Lopez, veterans who enlisted while domiciled in Puerto Rico
brought an equal protection challenge to a civil service employment
preference.136 The preference granted additional points on the civil
service examination scores to honorably discharged veterans who were
domiciled in New York at the time they joined the military.137 The
petitioners argued that this preference infringed upon the right to
travel, a fundamental constitutional right, which is “firmly established
and has been repeatedly recognized by our cases.”138 Noting that
the “right-to-migrate cases have principally involved the . . . indirect
manner of burdening the right,” the Court found the right infringed
upon by the deprivation of the veterans’ credits based on residence at
time of entry.139 By denying these benefits to otherwise qualified

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969).
Id.
See id. at 626–33.
Galloway, supra note 35, at 149.
Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 899–901 (1986).
Id. at 900.
Id. at 902–03.
Id. at 903, 910–11.
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veterans, New York sufficiently deterred the exercise of the right to
migrate in violation of the equal protection clause.
In the case of a ban on ectogenesis, the fundamental right would
indeed be infringed. Rather than an outright prohibition on the exercise
of the right to procreate, as in Kramer, a ban on the use of ectogenesis
would be an indirect infringement on women’s right to procreate by both
deterring its exercise and by making “the exercise of the right
materially more difficult.”140 Indeed, the burdens on the right to
procreate would be notably similar to the infringement on the right to
travel in Soto-Lopez. Like the right to travel, the right to procreate is a
fundamental right firmly established and repeatedly reaffirmed by the
Court. Under Soto-Lopez, when a classification materially deters the
exercise of a fundamental right, that right is infringed and the
classification cannot withstand scrutiny.141
Gestation imposes physical and psychological burdens and
injuries on even healthy women. There are few procreative options
for women who cannot or will not undergo the difficulties of
traditional reproduction, and a ban on reproductive ectogenesis would
unquestionably make procreation materially more difficult. Gestation
requires a womb—an organ that a broad class of individuals does not
have access to—including but not limited to heterosexual and
homosexual men, women with uterine malformations, women who
cannot gestate, women whose careers make gestation impossible or
unsafe, single parents, low-income couples with infertility, and women
who are HIV positive or who have other high-risk pregnancy markers.
In order to procreate, members of this “wombless class” must gain
access to a womb, which is often accomplished through a coparenting
relationship (marriage or parenting as a couple). But sometimes, these
wombless individuals can gain access via costly gestational surrogacy.
A ban on ectogenesis would substantially deter the members of the
aforementioned class from procreation, as cost-effective womb access is
a high barrier to their reproductive endeavor.
Currently, traditional and gestational surrogacy are some of the
only options for those who cannot traditionally bear children.142
Although traditional surrogacy is less expensive than gestational
140.
Galloway, supra note 35, at 149.
141.
Id.; see 476 U.S. at 903.
142.
The Different Types of Surrogacy: Which Is Right for You?, SURROGATE.COM,
https://surrogate.com/about-surrogacy/types-of-surrogacy/types-of-surrogacy/
[https://perma.cc/
7FZE-HXFJ] (last visited Mar. 2, 2021). Traditional surrogacy is where the surrogate is artificially
inseminated and both gestates the child and is the child’s biological mother. Id. Gestational
surrogacy is where in vitro fertilization is used to impregnate the surrogate with an embryo
created from the intended parents’ genetic material. Id.
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surrogacy, it produces a child genetically unrelated to the intended
mother, and still costs between $90,000 and $130,000 in the United
States.143 These factors render it inaccessible to the vast majority of
Americans. On the other hand, reproductive medical tourism to
countries like the Ukraine brings the cost of gestational surrogacy to an
average of $30,000, which is both still financially out of reach for most
prospective parents and inextricable from ethical concerns.144 Due to
widespread exploitation of surrogates, commercial surrogacy has been
banned in India, Nepal, and Thailand.145 These figures do not include
the cost of in vitro fertilization, which can cost anywhere between
$12,000 and $17,000 per cycle—and multiple cycles are frequently
required—nor do they include the potential costs of the surrogate’s loss
of work or other injuries, which are typically covered by the intended
parents.146 Surrogacy is a costly alternative, out of reach for most, and
sometimes ethically fraught.
Ectogenesis will enable women to exercise their right to
procreate without bearing the exceptional physical discomfort and
injury, risk of death, professional harm, and emotional stress inherent
to in vivo gestation. The existence of a technology that could drive down
the costs of gestating a fetus ex vivo would make procreation possible
for many, and it could obviate the choice between bodily integrity and
parenthood faced by all women. There can be little disagreement
that any child-bearing endeavor, whether by traditional gestation
or gestational surrogacy, involving the aforementioned harms of
pregnancy would be materially more difficult than the same endeavor
involving no such burdens. Therefore, the Court should find that a ban
on ectogenesis infringes on the fundamental right to procreate and
require, pursuant to the strict scrutiny standard, the government to
show that a ban is narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling government
interest.

143.
Surrogate Mother Costs, W. COAST SURROGACY, https://www.westcoastsurrogacy.com/surrogate-program-for-intended-parents/surrogate-mother-cost [https://perma.cc/VJL7ZFZJ] (last visited Mar. 2, 2021).
144.
See Madeline Roache, Ukraine’s ‘Baby Factories’: The Human Cost of Surrogacy, AL
JAZEERA (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/9/13/ukraines-baby-factoriesthe-human-cost-of-surrogacy [https://perma.cc/ZS7A-LNDN].
145.
Id.
146.
IVF – In Vitro Fertilization, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N (Apr. 24, 2019), https://americanpregnancy.org/infertility/in-vitro-fertilization-70966 [https://perma.cc/DA3T-ZK9M].
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VI. RATIONAL BASIS: NO SUSPECT CLASS AND NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Furthermore, even if the Court failed to recognize the
immutability and burden of a significant right demanding more bite to
its rational basis review, any ban on safe ectogenesis should still likely
fail for lack of a legitimate interest. If the Court were to conclude that
a ban on ectogenesis neither contains impermissible gender-based
discrimination nor infringes upon the fundamental right to procreate,
then the statute would be analyzed under a much less demanding
judicial standard: rational basis review. The rational basis test is the
“traditional standard of review,” applying to all government action not
subject to heightened scrutiny. The test “requires only that the [state
action] be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state
purposes.”147 The standard is highly deferential to the government,
presuming its classification to be constitutional, and the challenger
must prove that there is no conceivable rational basis that could
support the action.148 However, there are still government actions
struck down under rational basis review as being based on illegitimate
state interests, and any state interest in banning safe ectogenesis is
likely illegitimate.
A. Legitimate State Interests
Under rational basis review, the challenger bears the burden of
proving that there is no rational relation between the government
action and a legitimate state interest.149 In rational basis jurisprudence,
courts have broadly construed the legitimacy of state interests to ensure
wide latitude for a government’s enactment. In addition, courts have
often considered any conceivable government interest as sufficient
grounds for enactment.150 The legislature is permitted to fashion
remedies that are over- or underinclusive, and “reform may take one
step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind.”151 In the absence of an actual
statute and corresponding legislative history to analyze, this Article is
limited to a discussion of what state interests might be set forth in
support of a ban on ectogenetic technologies, although they are not
difficult to predict. In the ectogenesis context, stated legitimate
interests might include the preservation of maternal health, the safety
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).
See id.
See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
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of unborn fetuses, the welfare of children potentially born via
ectogenesis, or the regulation of the practice of medicine. If any of the
aforementioned legitimate interests are the only ones evidenced by the
legislative history, any legal challenge to an ectogenesis ban, if
analyzed under the rational basis review, would likely fail. Throughout
this Part, the Article discusses those interests that are illegitimate and
cannot support government regulations, even under rational basis
review.
There is a middle-ground state, whereby a legitimate
government interest is “tainted” by an illegitimate purpose.152 In this
hybrid situation, “the reasoning or motivation leading a state to pursue
an ostensibly legitimate state interest includes an illegitimate
assumption or belief, such as an irrational fear or impermissible
stereotype.”153 To give a hypothetical example, if the legitimate interest
of protecting the welfare of infants is based on the illegitimate
stereotype that a mother who would choose to gestate via ectogenesis is
uncaring and thus unfit, the legitimate interest is tainted as
inextricably linked to the illegitimate one. Given the congressional
tendency toward Puritanism regarding reproductive biotechnology, this
type of hybrid legitimacy situation is likely to occur.
Plainly illegitimate interests, including any interest rooted in
animus or manifesting moral disapproval, cannot validly support a ban
on ectogenesis, even under the most deferential rational basis level of
scrutiny.
B. Animus Is Not a Legitimate State Interest
In Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down an amendment to
Colorado’s constitution prohibiting any “legislative, executive or
judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to
protect . . . gays and lesbians.”154 The Amendment (Amendment 2)
required the immediate repeal of any state or local policy that “barred
discrimination based on sexual orientation” and prevented any such
measures from being adopted in the future.155 The Court opinion stated
that Amendment 2 “impose[d] a special disability upon” gay and
lesbian people and denied them “protections against exclusion from
an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that

152.
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78
U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 308 (2011).
153.
Id.
154.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996).
155.
Id. at 626–27.
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constitute[d] ordinary civic life in a free society.”156 Finding that the
Amendment was an excessively broad “status-based enactment,” the
Court held that it was too “far removed” from the articulated state
interests to be rationally related to them.157 Referring to the holding in
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno that animus can
never be a legitimate state interest, it struck down Amendment 2 as
violative of the equal protection clause.158
Under Romer, any ban on the use of ectogenesis rooted in disgust
or animus is illegitimate. As discussed throughout this Article,
ectogenesis invokes visceral responses from individuals all over the
political, spiritual, and identity spectrums. The reaction to a certain
technology as “unfair, unseemly, or just plain wrong” has been called
the “yuck factor.”159 Bioethicists have raised these arguments “in an
effort to defeat the use or expansion of biotechnological advances such
as human cloning, nanotechnology (including nanobiotechnology and
nanomedicine), assisted human reproduction” and many others.160 Leon
Kass, former chairman of the President’s Council on Bioethics
characterized the yuck factor as “the emotional expression of deep
wisdom, beyond reason’s power completely to articulate.”161 He
suggested that this “wisdom of repugnance” should guide discussions
and decisions regarding bioethics.162
While Kass proposes origins of wisdom for these admittedly
“emotional expression[s],” reason is a process of conscious deductive
reasoning from verifiable facts, not an amorphous and immeasurable
gut feeling. Instead, the yuck factor is a form of knee-jerk animus. It is
the revulsion one feels toward someone or something before they are
able to bring forth any rational basis. Martha Nussbaum has criticized
reliance on the yuck factor, noting that, historically, yuck factor
arguments have been used to justify racism, sexism, anti-Semitism,
homophobia, and other forms of discrimination.163 She posits that the
“moral progress of society can be measured by the degree to which it
separates disgust from danger and indignation, basing laws and social
156.
Id. at 631.
157.
Id. at 635.
158.
Id. at 634–35 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
159.
Jamila Jefferson-Jones, The Exchange of Inmate Organs for Liberty: Diminishing the
“Yuck Factor” in the Bioethics Repugnance Debate, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 105, 106 (2013).
160.
Id.
161.
LEON R. KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE CHALLENGE FOR
BIOETHICS 150 (paperback ed. 2004).
162.
See generally Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, NEW REPUBLIC, June 2, 1997,
at 17.
163.
See Martha C. Nussbaum, Danger to Human Dignity: The Revival of Disgust and
Shame in the Law, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 6, 2004, at B6, B7–B8.
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rules on substantive harm, rather than on the symbolic relationship an
object bears to our anxieties.”164
In the case of ectogenesis, constitutionally illegitimate animus
might manifest as disgust for the suite of technologies involved in full
ectogenesis. This would be a misinterpretation because the technologies
utilized in full ectogenesis are the same technologies already used in
partial ectogenesis to finish the development of premature infants.
Breathing apparati, feeding tubes, waste removal, incubation, and
other pieces of the ectogenesis suite are currently operating in NICUs
worldwide, much to the appreciation and praise of Congress and society
at large. To achieve full ectogenesis, modifications of preexisting
technologies will be made, but the essential functions of these
technologies will not be novel. If disgust is absent toward the
technologies already applied in other contexts, then disgust toward the
same technologies applied to full ectogenesis must not be about the
technology itself, but the intended end: the voluntary gestation of
babies outside of a woman’s body. In other words, liberating women
from the risks and discomforts of gestation may be what provokes the
yuck response.
Animus toward the process of full ectogenesis would be animus
toward the female rejection of or incapacity for the childbearing role.
Men face no such animus for failing to gestate their children inside their
bodies. Instead, this animus would be particularized toward women and
based on social expectations for the roles occupied by women’s bodies.
In the context of gestation, there is no meaningful distinction between
biological roles and social roles. Romer and its progeny have instructed
that animus is not a legitimate government interest. Therefore, any ban
on ectogenesis based on a government purpose rooted in bare disgust or
a yuck response should not satisfy the requirement of legitimacy, even
under the deferential rational basis standard.
C. Moral Condemnation Is Not a Legitimate State Interest
In the 2003 case of Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court struck
down a Texas anti-sodomy statute on due process and equal protection
grounds, reaffirming the right to privacy within interpersonal and
family decisions, as well as the right to equal treatment under the
law.165 Importantly, Lawrence held that moral disapproval does not
constitute a legitimate state interest.166 This holding suggests that, in

164.
165.
166.

Id. at B8.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
See id. at 571.
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the future, the Court would be unlikely to uphold a ban on ectogenesis
that is justified by any blatant moral propositions. Impermissible
manifestations of moral condemnation include assertions that it is
wrong to deviate from biological imperatives, beliefs that the traditional
social role of women should be preserved, and the belief that ectogenesis
offends a spiritual entity or nature. Indeed, any permutation of a
government interest that seeks to preserve the biological role of women
as gestators can be reduced to the illegitimate morality-based purpose
of condemning deviation from a biological and social role.
With regards to gestation, biological and social roles have been,
thus far, inseparable. In Nguyen v. INS, the Court held that the
“difference between men and woman in relation to the birth process is
a real one, and the principle of equal protection does not forbid Congress
to address the problem at hand in a manner specific to each gender.”167
One might interpret this to suggest that any gender-based distinctions
regarding the birth process are legitimate. However, the Court
considers the classifications made in the context of the specific problem
the legislature seeks to address. In Nguyen, the government sought to
assure a parent-child relationship between the citizen parent and the
child seeking citizenship. In childbirth, the gestating mother is
apparent so the ease of proving maternity exceeds the ease of proving
paternity. There is a meaningful distinction to be made between the
sexes for the purposes of proving a parent-child relationship, which is
rationally related to the heightened standards for establishing
paternity created by the challenged statute. No such meaningful
distinction would exist between men and women with regards to a ban
on ectogenesis. Instead, a ban on ectogenesis justified by the distinct
biological role of women would be an impermissible attempt to legislate
social roles or to preserve a gestating class of persons.
A gender-based stereotype is “a generalised view or
preconception about attributes or characteristics that are or ought to be
possessed by, or the roles that are or should be performed by women
and men.”168 The social roles we occupy, and the stereotypes used to
enforce them, are partial products of our biological capacities and
limitations. The biological “birth lottery” determines the reproductive
organs we are and are not born with, and social gender roles influence
how others react toward us vis-à-vis biological chance. The Court should
find resounding injustice in allowing the enforcement through law of

167.
Tuan Anh Nguyen v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
168.
Gender Stereotyping, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/WRGS/Pages/GenderStereotypes.aspx [https://perma.cc/
2XAZ-7U6Q] (last visited Feb. 23, 2021).
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immutable biological roles, as these roles are meaningful only to the
extent that society maps behavioral expectations onto biological
attributes. Forcing female-bodied humans, rather than machines, to
perform the social function of gestation creates a caste based on
immutable characteristics, which is repugnant to the principles of equal
protection.
Per the Lawrence holding that moral disapproval cannot be a
legitimate state interest, any government interest that is based on the
moral position that biological destiny requires female-bodied people to
gestate cannot prevail under rational basis review. In Lawrence, the
Court found that the impermissible moral objection had been “shaped
by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and
respect for the traditional family.”169 The gendered biosocial roles
implicated by ectogenesis are shaped by these same factors.
Moral objections to ectogenesis are widespread. Religious bodies
and authors have singled out ectogenesis as a unique threat to the
traditional family. Susan E. Wills wrote that despite the “burden on a
mother’s physical health,” pregnancy is “a graced time . . . for learning
the selfless art of mothering.”170 The inference is that ectogenesis would
remove the mother and child from “grace” and prevent the mother from
developing the virtue of selflessness required to be a good mother.
Further, in 1987, the Vatican released Instruction on Respect for
Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation, explaining
the Roman Catholic Church’s moral objections to the use of
heterologous and homologous in vitro fertilization, gestational and
traditional surrogacy, and heterologous- and homologous-assisted
insemination.171 In this position paper, the Church stated that
“[s]urrogate motherhood represents an objective failure to meet the
obligations of maternal love, of conjugal fidelity and of responsible
motherhood; it offends the dignity and the right of the child to be
conceived, carried in the womb, brought into the world and brought up
by his own parents.”172 Asserting that surrogacy “sets up, to the
detriment of families, a division between the physical, psychological
and moral elements which constitute those families,” the Church takes
169.
170.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571
Susan E. Wills, Growing Babies in Artificial Wombs: Inevitable? Desirable? Moral?,
ALETEIA (Aug. 13, 2014), https://aleteia.org/2014/08/13/growing-babies-in-artificial-wombs-inevitable-desirable-moral/3/ [https://perma.cc/VUL8-ZXFR].
171.
THE VATICAN, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN AND ON THE
DIGNITY OF PROCREATION (1987), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.html
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a clear stance in opposition to the use of traditional or gestational
surrogacy.173 While the Roman Catholic Church has not yet given a
formal statement on the permissibility of ectogenesis, it has held that
“the hypothesis or project of constructing artificial uteruses for the
human embryo” is “contrary to the human dignity proper to the
embryo.”174 These religious arguments speaking to the division of labor
within and nature of a traditional family are precisely the type of moral
objections that Lawrence has held cannot support legislative action,
even under rational basis review.
Moral objections based on other, less-gendered conceptions of
“right and acceptable behavior” are likewise wrongful bases for support
of legislative acts. In a 1996 interview with the New York Times,
bioethicist Arthur L. Caplan stated that the intervention in human
reproductive processes poses many moral and ethical questions such
that “[t]he future is rosy for bioethicists.”175 Feminist bioethicist
Rosemarie Tong has expressed concern that ectogenesis “could lead to
a commodification of the whole process of pregnancy.”176 And Stephen
Wilkinson has addressed arguments against commodification in the
context of selective reproduction, noting that “to call something
‘commodification’ is to express moral disapproval and to refer to a
distinctive kind of wrong: the wrong of commodification.”177 To
commodify something, Wilkinson argues, is to treat it as if it (1) has a
price, (2) is fungible, and (3) has only instrumental value.178 While no
cogent outlines of how ectogenesis will cause this purported
commodification of babies or pregnancy have been set forth, such
arguments are rooted in moral disapproval and, thus, cannot serve as
legitimate state interests.
In Lawrence, the Court made clear that arguments based on
moral disapproval, such as religious beliefs, views of the traditional
family, or conceptions of proper and acceptable behavior, are not
legitimate state interests. Our cultural, political, and bioethical
landscapes are littered with moral critiques of ectogenesis, and these
critiques are guaranteed to inform Congress’s treatment of ectogenesis
in the future. Therefore, any state interest backing a ban on safe
ectogenesis is likely to be illegitimate and unable to withstand even
rational basis review.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
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VII. RATIONAL BASIS WITH BITE
Even if the Court were to conclude that a ban on ectogenesis
neither contains impermissible gender-based discrimination, nor
infringement upon the fundamental right to procreate, the Court should
find ectogenesis bans violative of equal protection. When the Court
finds that neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny applies, it analyzes
statutes under the much less demanding judicial standard—rational
basis review. The rational basis test is the “traditional standard of
review,” applying to all government action not subject to heightened
scrutiny, which “requires only the [state action] be shown to bear some
rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.”179
However, while cases analyzed under the deferential rational
basis test generally resolve in favor of the government actor, there were
eighteen cases between 1971 and 2014 that were analyzed under
rational basis and resolved in favor of the challenger.180 These cases,
where the Court seemed to apply a somewhat higher standard, have
been referred to as “rational basis with bite” cases.181 In an analysis of
these cases, Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel identified nine factors that
generally recur, casting some light on the conditions that cause the
Court to apply this modified rational basis standard.182 The factors
include “history of discrimination, political powerlessness, capacity to
contribute to society, immutability, burdening a significant right,
animus, federalism concerns, discrimination of an unusual character,
and inhibiting personal relationships.”183 Of the aforementioned
factors, the two most likely to appear where the Court applies rational
basis with bite are immutability and the burdening of a substantial
right.184 This Part briefly discusses the Court’s use of rational basis with
bite and evaluates the likely outcome of a challenge to a ban on
ectogenesis should the Court apply this heightened standard. The
ability to gestate is immutable, pertains to the exercise of the
fundamental right to procreate, and carries a history of discrimination.
Thus, if the Court applies rational basis to a ban on ectogenesis, that
rational basis should “bite” and some of the burden should be shifted to
the government to provide the rationality of its actions.
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San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
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Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: When Does Rational
Basis Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2072 (2015).
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Id. at 2072.
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Id. at 2077.
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Id. at 2072.
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In the rational basis with bite cases, the Court purports to apply
the rational basis test, yet deviates from some of the core features that
define that deferential standard. Whereas the challenger bears the
entire burden of proving that there is no conceivable state interest
rationally related to the government’s enactment under the traditional
rational basis test, the Court might “shift the burden to the State to
prove the enactment’s rationality,” “deem the purpose of the legislation
to be an illegitimate state interest,” “weigh the benefits and harms of
the challenged statute,” “demand persuasive evidence” from the
government, or “reject a statute that furthers a state interest by
burdening one group while ignoring the other groups” when rational
basis bites.185 While under the traditional rational basis test the
challenger bears the entire burden of proving that there is no
conceivable state interest rationally related to the government’s
enactment, the Court takes liberties with this level of deference
whenever rational basis bites. A ban on ectogenesis would implicate a
majority of the recurring factors in rational basis with bite cases,
including a history of discrimination, immutability, burdening a
significant right, animus, federalism concerns, discrimination of an
unusual character, and inhibiting personal relationships. The Sections
that follow consider immutability and the burdening of a significant
right because these factors seem most suggestive of the Court’s
willingness to apply the heightened standard.186
A. Immutability
A trait is immutable when it is not amenable to change.
Immutable traits include race, national origin, alienage, illegitimacy,
and gender.187 Judge William A. Norris discussed the nature of
immutable traits stating that “at a minimum . . . the Supreme Court is
willing to treat a trait as effectively immutable if changing it would
involve great difficulty, such as requiring a major physical change or a
traumatic change of identity.”188 The difficulty of the change is not the
dispositive feature of immutability; instead, it implicates “those traits
that are so central to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for
185.
Id. at 2075.
186.
See id. at 2078.
187.
See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (first citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); then citing Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); then citing Graham v.
Richardson 403 U.S. 365 (1971); then citing Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); and then citing
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
188.
Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, J.,
concurring).
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government to penalize a person for refusing to change them.”189
Continuing, Judge Norris held that, for example, racial discrimination
“would not suddenly become constitutional if medical science developed
an easy, cheap, and painless method of changing one’s skin pigment.”190
In Plyler v. Doe, the Court held that “legislation imposing special
disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond
their control suggests the kind of ‘class or caste’ treatment that the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.”191 Thus, the US legal
system rejects the imposition of burdens on individuals due to the
fortunes or misfortunes of their draw in the birth lottery. In Fronteiro
v. Richardson, for example, the Court identified “that the key factor is
that the trait is beyond the individual’s control” because in order to
adhere to basic principles of equal protection, “legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility.”192
The inability to pursue the fundamental right to procreate
without the painful and sometimes dangerous physical burdens of
pregnancy is necessarily an immutable characteristic. A person is
either born with or without the physical capacity to gestate. For those
born with female reproductive organs, the survival of our species and
the transmission of the individual’s genetic material to the next
generation requires a substantial invasion of bodily autonomy. Absent
ectogenesis, every person who becomes a parent does so through the use
of a woman’s uterus: either their own, their partner’s, or a surrogate’s.
This biological fact renders women indispensable parts of the
reproductive process, but it also burdens their bodies in ways dangerous
and difficult, as discussed throughout this Article. These burdens are
immutable in that they are unavoidable without technological
intervention. The Court has consistently recognized procreation as a
fundamental right and should thus recognize the importance of access
to reproductive biotechnology in furtherance of the expression of that
right.
The immutability of reproductive organs in the context of the
essential function of reproduction, both for individual and broader
survival needs of humankind, renders ectogenesis important for
relieving women of their technologically avoidable roles within the
hierarchy of reproductive burdens. Precluding women from utilizing
technologies that could enable procreation without bodily intrusion
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Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982).
Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 180, at 2085–86; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
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prevents women from leaving the gestating class, unless they are also
willing to sacrifice the pursuit of parenthood—a right that has been
repeatedly affirmed as fundamental. But women do not gestate for
themselves alone. They bear the societal burden of gestation to the
benefit of other women (in the case of surrogacy), men (in nearly all
cases), the children gestated and delivered, the government, and the
human species as a whole. But the role of gestator is assigned at birth
and carries physical, economic, and social costs. Judge Norris spoke of
immutable characteristics as traits “that are so central to a person’s
identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person
for refusing to change them.”193 The corollary of this is that an
immutable characteristic is so central to a person’s identity that it
would be abhorrent, and contrary to principles of equal protection, to
penalize a person for changing them. Ectogenesis provides an
opportunity for women to change the impact of an immutable
characteristic on their roles in society and within the family, without
having to sacrifice the deep personal meanings of parenthood or the
privacy of the marital relationship by involving another woman to serve
as surrogate. For a legislature to deny them that opportunity is to
legislate a permanent class or caste of gestating people, which is
repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Burdening of a Significant Right
As when legislative action implicates an immutable
characteristic, the Court is more likely to apply rational basis with bite
when the government act burdens a significant right. Although they are
not fundamental, significant rights may be those that are “substantial
enough to warrant careful review of the law’s rationality,” perhaps
because the rights are very important or “quasi-fundamental.”194
In Plyler v. Doe, the Court held that, although education is not a
fundamental right, the interest is important enough to warrant a more
searching review of the statute’s rationality.195 Holocyz-Pimentel’s
article identifies several rational basis with bite cases where the
Court did not specifically address the rights at stake, but where each
involved “important personal interests pertaining to the home and
association.”196 For example, in Lindsey v. Normet, the Court found that
a double-bond and other burdensome requirements for an appeal of
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Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726.
Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 180, at 2089.
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221–24.
Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 180, at 2092.

818

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:4:779

eviction cases violated the equal protection clause because it bore “no
reasonable relationship to any valid state objective.”197 The Court
stated that while it did not “denigrate the importance of decent, safe,
and sanitary housing . . . the Constitution does not provide judicial
remedies for every social and economic ill.”198 There, the interest was
important, but not fundamental such that it warranted strict scrutiny.
In cases involving substantial, but not fundamental, rights, the Court
can “avoid establishing or enlarging a fundamental right with
potentially far-reaching consequences” by applying a heightened
rational basis review to a specific case.199
Ectogenesis implicates the fundamental right to procreate, but
it also implicates the important or substantial right to utilize
technology to improve health outcomes. The Court has not yet rendered
a decision about whether certain reproductive technologies, such as in
vitro fertilization, are protected as fundamental or quasi-fundamental
rights. However, fundamental or not, it is improbable that the Court
would fail to identify the important interest of prospective mothers in
using ectogenetic technology to avoid the substantial physical risks
inherent to traditional gestation. The Court might also find the
economic and social hardships borne by gestating women substantial
enough to warrant a more searching review of the rationality of a ban
on ectogenesis. Ectogenesis implicates immutable characteristics and
substantial or important rights. Therefore, if the Court chose to apply
the rational basis test, that test should bite. This might look like
shifting the burden to the government, requiring greater justification
for the legitimate government interest, or seeking more convincing
evidence that the ban is rationally related to the state interest
articulated.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As tools from far-future science fiction converge with our reality,
we are challenged to engage with each innovation so as to maximize
human welfare. Partial ectogenesis is here and the advent of full
ectogenesis is imminent. The Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection clause provides ample avenues for protecting access to
ectogenetic technology. Whether the Court applies intermediate
scrutiny, strict scrutiny, rational basis, or rational basis with bite, there
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are strong arguments to be made in support of a challenger’s equal
protection rights to use ectogenesis for reproductive purposes.
The best of conservatism strikes a balance between preserving
what is precious while simultaneously holding the truth that humanity
must constantly adapt or die out. In every neonatal intensive care unit,
a suite of once-unimaginable ectogenetic technologies supports the most
delicate members of humankind. As these technologies continue to
develop, we will become empowered to save countless infants born too
young, too frail, or too small to survive without assistance. Mothers will
be saved from nerve damage, incontinence, hemorrhaging, and death.
Prospective parents, once unable to procreate, will access supportive
technologies that help them create a family. That twenty-four-week-old
infant saved by ectogenesis could be the next Maya Angelou, Jennifer
Doudna, or Luigi Boccherini.
That is the essence of what ectogenesis is about: the flourishing
of human life. And that is the essence of what the Constitution and
equal protection clause are about: the flourishing of human life. They
are simply tools to reach that goal.

